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Informal Closing of the Bypass:
Minors' Petitions to Bypass Parental
Consent for Abortion in an
Age of Increasing Judicial Recusals
LAUREN TREADWELL*
INTRODUCTION
Sarah is a young woman who lives in a suburb of Memphis,
Tennessee, with her mother, stepfather, and three younger half-sisters.
After breaking up with her recent long-term boyfriend, whom she dated
for more than a year, she discovers that she is pregnant. Sarah is seven
months shy of her eighteenth birthday upon learning the news.'
Sarah has received a soccer scholarship to college next fall and
worries that having a baby will ruin her ability to fulfill the scholarship,
pursue her education, and fundamentally reduce her prospects for the
future. She would like to talk to her mother about the situation, but she
knows that her stepfather will find out if she does. Sarah's relationship
with her stepfather is tumultuous. Her stepfather does not treat Sarah
like he treats his own daughters and has expressed pointed concern to
her mother that Sarah is a bad influence on his three daughters. Sarah
strongly believes it will turn out very badly for her if he were to find out
that she is pregnant. She fears that her stepfather will kick her out of the
house and possibly become physically abusive.' Her stepfather has been
physically menacing to Sarah in the past, and occasionally violent-
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2007. I would like to
thank Professors Ashutosh Bhagwat, Geoffrey Hazard, John Malone, and Evan Lee for their
thoughtful insights and willingness to help. In addition, I am tremendously grateful for the love,
support, and encouragement of J.T. Treadwell and Sharron and Bob O'Pezio.
i. Sarah is a fictional character and her situation is hypothetical.
2. Fear of abuse is a common reason many pregnant minors give for not involving their parents
in the abortion decision. See infra Part III.
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destroying furniture and other household items during arguments. Sarah
decides against telling her mother and tries not to think about the
situation-perhaps with a teenager's hope that her problem will simply
go away.
A few months go by and Sarah begins to show. She starts wearing
loose and baggy clothing to hide her increasing waistline and realizes she
has to do something. Because she still does not want to have a baby,
Sarah decides to get an abortion. She finally works up the nerve to go to
Planned Parenthood, and during her consultation she finds out that
Tennessee has a parental consent law,3 which means that she cannot get
an abortion without first getting the consent of her parents. Telling her
mother is still not a viable option, so Sarah decides to apply for judicial
waiver of the parental consent law and permission to make the abortion
decision herself.4 She is intimidated about going to court and telling a
judge her story, but it seems like a better option than exposing herself to
her stepfather's certain rage. With the help of a representative from
Planned Parenthood, Sarah files all the necessary paperwork with the
court, hoping that it will all be over soon.
Unfortunately, the system breaks down for Sarah. None of the
circuit court judges in Memphis will hear her case; they all recuse
themselves from the case on moral grounds, citing their strong religious
beliefs that abortion is murder. Because Sarah did not start the process
immediately upon learning of her pregnancy, by the time she learns she
does not have immediate access to a judicial hearing she is already into
her second trimester. If she cannot get a judge to hear her case soon, it
may be too late -her pregnancy will advance beyond the point where she
can legally get an abortion. Therefore, it is imperative that a judge hear
her case or legally she will be forced to carry the pregnancy to term.
The above hypothetical situation is an increasingly likely possibility
for large numbers of young women in many parts of the United States. In
states as varied as Tennessee, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Alabama,
judges are recusing themselves on moral grounds from cases where
minors petition the court for the right to make their own decisions about
abortion. In conservative areas, these incidences of recusal are becoming
more publicly known as stances of conscience, and they may increase the
3. Although this is a hypothetical situation, Tennessee does, in fact, have a parental consent law.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1o-303 (2005 & Supp. 2006).
4. A judicial waiver (also called a judicial bypass) is the process through which a minor may
petition the court for a waiver of the state's law requiring parental consent or notification before a
minor can obtain an abortion. See infra Part I. The terms "judicial waiver" and "judicial bypass" are
used interchangeably throughout this Note.
5. See Adam Liptak, On Moral Grounds, Some Judges Are Opting Out of Abortion Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, § I (Nat'l Rep.), at 21; see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 440 (99o)
(noting that in Minnesota "a number of counties are served by judges who are unwilling to hear bypass
petitions").
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likelihood that additional judges (especially those elected or appointed in
conservative districts) will feel free to choose this option more readily. In
Memphis, Tennessee, for example, the majority of Shelby County Circuit
Court judges are refusing to hear minors' abortion petitions, resulting in
a dramatically increased workload for the remaining judges who are
willing to hear the petitions.6
This Note surveys the potential problems that may arise if judges
across the country continue to recuse themselves from minors' abortion
petitions on moral grounds. Part I provides a brief overview of the
history of abortion laws in the United States, specifically focusing on
parental consent statutes and the judicial bypass procedure. Part II
describes the current standards governing judicial recusal. Part III
examines the undue burden standard as defined by Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. Part IV studies the issues
resulting from judicial recusals from bypass petitions. In particular, Part
IV focuses on whether the recusals create an undue burden on the
minor's right to choose, the responsibility of the states to provide minors
with an effective judicial bypass procedure, and potential solutions to the
problem. This Note concludes that if judicial recusals from minors'
bypass petitions become widespread, more steps will need to be taken to
protect minors' reproductive rights.
I. OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL BYPASS LAWS
The United States Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Roe v. Wade
established that states cannot prohibit abortion prior to the viability of
the fetus.7 This rule applies to all abortions, regardless if the pregnant
woman is a minor or an adult.8 However, subsequent rulings have
allowed states to have some authority to restrict minors' rights in a
variety of contexts-including minors' rights to get an abortion.9 In
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), the Supreme Court advanced three policy
reasons behind state restrictions on minors' rights: "the peculiar
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
6. Liptak, supra note 5.
7. 410 U.S. r13, 164-66 (1973).
8. See Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 435 ("[T]he constitutional protection against unjustified state
intrusion into the process of deciding whether or not to bear a child extends to pregnant minors as well
as adult women."); see also Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti If), 443 U.S. 622, 642 (i979) ("[Tihe potentially
severe detriment facing a pregnant woman is not mitigated by her minority." (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at
153)); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do
not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.
Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."
(citations omitted)).
9. Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 635-36 & n.I3.
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child rearing."'" The Supreme Court then attempted to strike a
compromise between the state interests in protecting children and the
fundamental rights of minors." This compromise permits states to
require that a pregnant minor obtain parental consent before getting an
abortion, but only if the minor is given the opportunity to seek a waiver
of that consent through judicial bypass.'2 The judicial bypass procedure
allows a minor to petition the court for a waiver of the parental consent
law, thereby allowing her the right to make her own decision about
abortion without having to consult her parents.'3 Thus, the Court
acknowledged that while states have a significant interest in encouraging
parental involvement when a minor seeks an abortion, states cannot
allow parental involvement to inhibit minors' constitutionally-protected
right to abortion."
In Bellotti II, the Supreme Court examined a Massachusetts parental
consent statute that included a judicial bypass procedure, but only
allowed a minor to exercise that option after first consulting her parents
about her abortion decision.'5 If the minor's parents refused to give
consent, only then could the minor petition the court for a waiver of the
parental consent law.' 6 The Supreme Court struck down the statute and
stated "every minor must have the opportunity-if she so desires-to go
directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents."' 7 In
addition, the Supreme Court established guidelines concerning when a
minor's request for a waiver of a parental consent law must be granted.'
8
The Court said that a pregnant minor seeking a judicial waiver may
show either (i) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to
make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician,
independently of her parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able
to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in
her best interests. The proceeding in which this showing is made must
assure that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow,
will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide
an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained. In sum, the
procedure must ensure that the provision requiring parental consent
does not in fact amount to the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto"
that was found impermissible in Danforth.'9
so. Id. at 634.
I i. See id. at 649.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 647. Alternatively, Bellotti II provides that if the judge believes the minor is not mature
enough to make the decision herself, the judge may decide for the minor that an abortion is in her best
interest, thereby allowing her to get an abortion without consulting her parents. Id. at 647-48.
14. Id. at 648.
15. Id. at 625.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 647.
18. Id. at 643-44.
19. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Thus, Bellotti II has served as an outline for states to follow when
constructing statutes mandating parental involvement in a minor's
abortion decision.
Many states have legislation restricting young women's access to
abortion by requiring parental notification or consent if the woman is
under the age of eighteen," and most states have modeled their statutory
language after the language the Supreme Court used in its rulings on
parental involvement.2 2 To date, twenty-three states require one or both
parents to consent for a minor to get an abortion,23 thirteen states require
notification of one or both parents, 4 and another nine states have passed
some sort of parental involvement statute that remains unenforced 5
Regulations that mandate parental consent before a minor can get
an abortion are valid only if there is an alternative procedure in place
whereby the minor may petition the court for the right to get an abortion
without consulting her parents6 However, it is unclear whether the same
is true of parental notification statutes.2 ' The Supreme Court has ruled
that any statute that amounts to a "parental veto" over the minor's
abortion decision is unconstitutional if not accompanied by an option for
judicial bypass of the law. In addition, Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey mandates that restrictions cannot
20. See Helena Silverstein, In the Matter of Anonymous, a Minor: Fetal Representation in
Hearings to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, I I CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69, 75 (2O01).
21. GUTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN MINORS' ABORTIONS,
(Jan. 1, 2oo7), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-PIMA.pdf ("While most states laws
apply to minors under 18, South Carolina's law applies to women under 17 and Delaware's law applies
to women under i6.").
22. Silverstein, supra note 20, at 72.
23. See GuTrMACHER INST., supra note 21 (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming).
24. Id. (Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia).
25. Id. (Alaska, California, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and
New Mexico).
26. Bellotti H, 443 U.S. 622,647 (1979).
27. See Helena Silverstein & Leanne Speitel, "Honey, I Have No Idea": Court Readiness to
Handle Petitions to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 88 IOWA L. REV. 75, 81 (20O2) (noting that
although the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether parental notification statutes must be
accompanied by a judicial bypass option, "virtually all state laws that mandate parental notice of
abortion include a bypass provision modeled along the lines of Belloti H"). Most recently, in Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, the Supreme Court upheld a parental notification statute that
included a judicial bypass option. 497 U.S. 502, 506-o7 (i99o). The Court noted that notice statutes are
different from parental consent statutes because they do not give anyone veto power over the minor's
abortion decision, thus intimating that bypass procedures are not necessary for parental notification
statutes. See id. at 5 1o-I I
28. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,74 (s976).
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impose an "undue burden" on the minor's right to choose. 9 As defined
in Casey, "an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."3 Without
an effective bypass mechanism, parental consent or notification statutes
indirectly allow parental vetoes of a minor's abortion decision, thereby
creating an undue burden on the minor's right to choose. Thus, the
presence of an effective judicial bypass mechanism is fundamental to the
validity of parental consent or notification statutes.
II. STANDARDS GOVERNING JUDICIAL RECUSAL
It is generally believed that a "judge... [must] put aside, to the
extent humanly possible, values that are personal to him or her, including
values that are drawn from the set of religious beliefs which that judge
holds," in order to decide cases fairly and impartially.' However, it is not
realistic to expect that in all cases a judge will be able to successfully set
aside his or her personal values. In such cases the judge's ability to decide
the case objectively and impartially, as well as the public's faith in the
judge's likelihood to decide the case objectively and impartially, will be
significantly impaired.
The federal law governing recusal contains two separate standards.32
The first standard, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), provides for disqualification of a
judge in any proceeding in which his or her impartiality may be
questioned.33 The exact language of this section states, "[a]ny justice,
judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned."' Section 455(a) has been interpreted as the objective
standard that deals with the outward appearances of the judiciary.35 It
calls for the disqualification of any judge when his or her impartiality
may reasonably be in question, regardless of whether the judge feels as
though he or she can be objective and fair. 6
29. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
30. Id. at 877.
31. Richard B. Saphire, Religion and Recusal, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 351, 351-52 (1998).
32. For the purposes of this discussion, this Note will only focus on federal recusal standards.
Each state has their own standards for judicial recusal; however, the state standards are often modeled
after the federal language or are similar enough in purpose and effect to make a discussion of only the
federal standards generally applicable. See Sherrilyn A. Iffil, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity,
Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 99 n.19 (1997).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2oo).
34. Id.
35. Saphire, supra note 31, at 354; see also Liteky v. United States, 51o U.S. 540, 548 (1994)
("[What matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.").
36. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3549 (2d ed. 1984).
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Section 455(a) was amended in 1974 to read as it does now.37 This
amendment ended the duty-to-sit concept and marked a drastic change
in judicial recusal standards in federal courts." Prior to the 1974
amendment, the rule in federal courts was that judges had a duty to sit in
all cases except where grounds for disqualification met statutory
standards.39 Now, section 455(a) takes the position of a reasonable person
informed of all the facts and does not require an actual showing that the
judge would be impartial.4' Under section 455(a), if a reasonable person
knowing all the circumstances would question the judge's impartiality,
then there is a basis for disqualification.'
The second standard for judicial recusal, section 455(b)(I), states
that a judge shall also disqualify himself "[w]here he has a personal bias
or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding."'  As opposed to
section 455(a), section 455(b)(I) has been interpreted to require an
actual showing of bias, not simply the appearance of bias.43 However,
there is a significant amount of scholarly debate about what actually
defines "personal bias or prejudice."' At a minimum, it includes feelings
of personal animosity on the part of the judge towards one of the parties;
however, many scholars argue that it encompasses even more.' After
reviewing Supreme Court precedent on death qualified juries, Dean
(then Professor) John Garvey and Professor Amy Coney suggested that
"personal bias or prejudice" requires recusal when judges are faced with
a case in which their moral conscience would alter the way they
determine the facts or cause them to violate their oath to follow and
apply the law. 6
While Dean Garvey and Professor Coney's article was limited to
judges in capital murder cases, presumably the same conclusion holds
true for judges facing an abortion case. If the judge's moral beliefs about
abortion are so embedded in his conscience that he cannot bring himself
to neutrally apply the law, he should recuse himself from the case. The
critical assumption, however, is that there are other judges available who




40. See Saphire, supra note 31, at 354.
41. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 37.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(I) (2ooo).
43. Saphire, supra note 31, at 354.
44. See id.
45. Id.




valid in capital punishment cases,47 but is more suspect in abortion
proceedings. A problem arises when many or all of the judges recuse
themselves, resulting in a collective abdication of duty. One can make an
analogy to the problem of the "last lawyer in town" who refuses to assist
a client with a claim or defense that, although legally well grounded, is
repugnant to the lawyer's religious or moral beliefs. 8 Legal scholars have
long defended the ethics of criminal defense by pointing to this "last
lawyer" situation and by arguing that all lawyers partake of the ethical
right, and the shared duty, to serve.49 Similarly, judges would have an
ethical duty to hear abortion cases when there is no other judge available
since recusal by the "last judge" effectively would deprive the minor of
her legal entitlement. Thus, judges should not have a completely
unqualified right to recuse themselves; rather each judge has an ethical
duty, shared with others, to allocate the task of serving even in unpopular
cases. Unfortunately, however, the mere presence of a shared ethical
duty may not be enough to ensure judges will actually be willing to serve.
Many believe that in a secular state judges are obligated to enforce
the law, and if a judge cannot, or will not, enforce the law, he or she
should be forced to resign. For example, Senator Charles E. Schumer
wrote a letter to the editor of The New York Times arguing it was a
"dereliction of duty" for federal judges to recuse themselves from cases
that require them to impose mandatory minimum prison sentences for
violations of federal drug laws." Although many likely share Senator
Schumer's point of view,5' it is not consistent with federal law. No
provision of federal law requires a judge to resign simply because the
judge's moral beliefs might interfere with the case. To the contrary,
federal law only requires recusal. In an often-quoted passage on judicial
disqualification, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist said, "[p]roof that a
Justice's mind at the time he joined the court was a complete tabula rasa
in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of
qualification, not lack of bias.""
47. There is no scholarly research, newspaper or periodical citation, or other information
suggesting there is a problem finding replacements for judges who recused themselves from capital
punishment cases.
48. Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543,562.
49. See Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1475-77 (1966); W. William Hodes, Accepting and
Rejecting Clients- The Moral Autonomy of the Second-to-the-Last Lawyer in Town, 48 KAN. L. REV.
977, 983-85 (2000); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 613, 613.
5o. Charles E. Schumer, Letter to the Editor, The Judges Transgress, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1993, at
A14.
51. For examples of similar opinions, see generally Avern Cohn, Letter to the Editor, A
Questionable Exclusion, 78 JUDICATURE 5 (1994) and A.M. Rosenthal, Dismantling the War, N.Y.
TIMES, May i8, 1993, at A21.
52. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972).
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Based on the current state of the law on judicial recusal, state court
judges who recuse themselves from cases where minors petition the court
for a waiver of the parental consent laws do not violate their ethical
obligations as a member of the judiciary. Rather, judges, who because of
strongly held religious or moral beliefs about abortion cannot impartially
apply the law, appropriately recuse themselves from such cases.
However, despite the appropriateness of this behavior, constitutional
problems inevitably result.
While a judge bases his or her individual recusal decision on his or
her distinct moral beliefs, and such private conduct does not have to
comply with the Constitution,53 the states in which the judges work are
under a constitutional obligation to provide minors with an effective
judicial bypass procedure. 4  States must ensure effective bypass
procedures regardless of the various political or moral leanings of their
judges. Thus, a constitutional challenge develops when so many state
court judges recuse themselves that the judicial bypass mechanism ceases
to be effective. In such cases, the judges' actions, when viewed
collectively, may create a substantial obstacle to a safe and timely
abortion and thereby rise to the level of state action imposing an undue
burden on minors' rights to choose abortion. Judges act in their official
capacities when they refuse to hear bypass petitions and their collective
abdication of duty can be chargeable to the state.55 If the judicial bypass
procedure is no longer considered "sufficiently expeditious" or effective
because of rampant recusals, the state has implicitly allowed an undue
burden on minors' fundamental right to abortion.
III. THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD
As discussed briefly in Part I, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey established the undue burden standard as the
current standard used to examine the constitutionality of state abortion
regulations. 6 The authors of the joint opinion in Casey stated the
following about the undue burden standard: "Regulations which...
[only] create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or
guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the
unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the
53. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.4.1, at 547 (3d ed.
2oo6).
54. Bellotti I. 443 U.S. 622,647 (1979).
55. The Supreme Court has ruled that the "action of state courts and judicial officers in their
official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 14 (1948).
56. 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). While Casey was a joint opinion with only three Justices (O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter) supporting the undue burden standard, id. at 843, 878, the subsequent case of
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), established the undue burden standard as the standing
precedent on abortion with five Justices voting in agreement.
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woman's exercise of the right to choose."57 Thus, under the undue burden
standard, states may express a clear preference for childbirth rather than
abortion and may impose any regulation in furtherance of that
preference so long as the regulation does not amount to a substantial
obstacle.: The authors of the joint opinion further stated:
To promote the State's profound interest in potential life, throughout
pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the woman's
choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will
not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to
choose childbirth over abortion."
Judicial recusals are likely not the type of "regulation" the Court
had in mind when deciding Casey, but nonetheless recusals have the
same effect as laws regulating access to abortion, and consequently, the
recusals trigger application of the undue burden standard. Here, like the
regulations discussed in Casey, the recusals are focused on abortion. That
is, the recusals occur specifically in abortion cases and may even be
attempts by the judges to make it more difficult for minors to obtain an
abortion at all.6" The net effect of widespread recusals could be similar to
a situation where the state passed a regulation severely restricting
minors' access to the courts by requiring all bypass petitions to be
funneled through only one or two judges in the whole state; however,
instead of the state passing a law regulating access, the judges have
regulated access through aggregated individual decisions in their capacity
as state actors. Therefore, if the recusals are widespread they are, in
effect, additional regulations of abortion triggering the undue burden
standard.
It is also important to note that the joint opinion in Casey made clear
that when determining whether there is undue burden on the right to
choose "[t]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for
whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is
irrelevant., 6' As a result, the argument that judicial recusals do not create
an undue burden on the majority of pregnant minors because they
involve their parents in the abortion decision voluntarily is irrelevant to
the issue under discussion. 62 Rather, the proper focus of the
57. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
58. Id. at 878.
59- Id.
60. Although it may be impossible to determine the exact motivation behind each recusal, Judge
John R. McCarroll of Shelby County Circuit Court in Memphis, Tennessee has stated that he believes
abortion to be taking the life of an innocent human being and against the moral order. Liptak, supra
note 5. It is therefore logical to assume that Judge McCarroll, and others who share his views, are
recusing themselves from abortion petitions in the hope that it will make it more difficult for minors to
obtain an abortion and may dissuade the minors from getting an abortion at all.
61. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.
62. In fact, nearly half of teens voluntarily involve their parents in the abortion decision. Based
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constitutional inquiry is on the group of young women that relies on the
judicial bypass procedure as the sole mechanism for exercising its
fundamental right to choose. According to a study published in Family
Planning Perspectives, an estimated 22% of pregnant minors did not
consult a parent about their abortion decision because they feared being
kicked out of the house, and 8% were credibly concerned they would be
physically abused because their parents had beaten them before. Young
women who need the judicial bypass procedure may be a minority of the
population affected by parental involvement laws, but their reasons for
needing the procedure are credible and serious. For these young women,
the recusals may operate as a substantial obstacle to their right to choose
an abortion, and the inquiry must focus on whether there is an undue
burden on this subset of the population.
IV. PROBLEMS CREATED BY BYPASS PETITION RECUSALS
Judicial recusals from cases where a minor petitions the court for a
waiver of the state's parental consent law raise numerous questions.
Specifically, the recusals raise questions regarding: (a) whether the
recusals impose an undue burden on the pregnant minor's right to
choose; (b) the responsibility of the states to remedy the situations if an
undue burden has been established; (c) potential solutions to the
problem; and finally, (d) the possibility of a procedural due process
violation if the pregnant minor cannot find a judge willing to hear her
petition.
A. Do THE RECUSALS IMPOSE AN UNDUE BURDEN?
In Casey, the Supreme Court stated explicitly that "not every law
which makes a right more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an
infringement of that right." 64 The Court further explained "[t]he fact that
a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right
itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more
expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it."
65
Thus, the Court held that a state-mandated twenty-four hour waiting
period before obtaining an abortion does not amount to a substantial
obstacle even though it may impose added costs, both in terms of time
and money, on the woman.
As an analogy to the twenty-four hour waiting period in Casey, the
on a national survey of more than 1500 unmarried minors having abortions in states without parental
involvement laws, 45% of young women discussed the decision to have an abortion with at least one of
their parents. Stanley K. Henshaw & Kathryn Kost, Parental Involvement in Minors' Abortion
Decisions, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 196, 2oo tbl.3 (I992).
63. Id. at 200.
64. 505 U.S. at 873.
65. Id. at 874.
66. Id. at 886-87.
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judicial recusals at issue here likely do not impose a substantial obstacle
on the minor's right to choose if only a small minority of judges per
jurisdiction refuse to hear bypass petitions. If there are still a substantial
number of judges in the jurisdiction willing to hear the petitions, the
inconvenience and burden on the minor's right will be minimal. If only
one or two judges recuse themselves, the minor's petition could be
quickly and easily reassigned to another judge. In such a scenario, it is
likely the process would be quick enough that the minor's petition would
be heard and resolved with sufficient expedition to meet the standard
laid out in Bellotti H and the minor may never even be aware of the
recusal.
In jurisdictions where the number of judges recusing themselves
from bypass petitions threatens the expeditious processing of such cases,
an acceptable alternative would be to reassign the minor's petition to a
willing judge in a neighboring county, as often happens in Minnesota.
67
The District Court responsible for the initial findings of fact in Hodgson
v. Minnesota found that bypass petitions filed in non-metropolitan parts
of Minnesota, which are often served by judges unwilling to hear the
petitions, are reassigned to judges in the metropolitan parts of the state
who are more willing to hear such petitions. 68 The minor must then travel
to reach the willing judge in order to receive an expeditious hearing of
her petition.69 The District Court concluded that although the
reassignments were burdensome, they did "not reflect a systemic failure
to provide a judicial bypass option in the most expeditious practicable
manner."
70
While in most high population density jurisdictions one of the above
acceptable situations is usually present, for an increasing number of
jurisdictions, particularly in socially conservative regions of the country,
the situation is rapidly becoming more tenuous. Due to a number of
factors, there is a high likelihood that in some jurisdictions the adequate
judicial resources necessary for the expedient resolution of bypass
petitions may disappear. First, the last two decades have seen a
resurgence of social conservatism at all levels of government. This
conservative ascendancy has placed more judges with socially
conservative views in more jurisdictions, raising the overall number and
percentage of judges likely to recuse themselves.7' Second, in the current




71. See generally Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of George W. Bush's Judges: How
Sharp a Turn to the Right?, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF AMERICAN POLmCS: CLASSIC AND
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 429, 438-41 (Samuel Kernell & Steven S. Smith eds., 3d ed. 2007)
(discussing a study of thousands of federal court cases revealing that judges appointed by President
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political climate where states such as South Dakota have openly
challenged Roe v. Wade,72 it seems unlikely that more states will adopt
process-facilitating solutions similar to Minnesota's; rather, the opposite
may be the trend.73 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, judicial
recusal has become more visible74 and more political, increasing the
likelihood that socially conservative judges will consider recusal, that
abortion opponents will pressure judges for future recusals, and that
political appointments of judges may consider future recusals as part of
the qualification for appointment. In short, a storm is brewing that is
likely to produce an unfortunate situation like that described in the
Introduction to this Note-where not enough judges in the jurisdiction
will hear petitions and parental veto rights will be indirectly granted.
Thus, in order to correctly analyze the impact of the recusals on the
minors' right, it is not appropriate to assume that only a few judges are
refusing to hear bypass petitions. Rather, a more current and relevant
question is whether it is constitutionally permissible for a substantial
proportion of judges in a jurisdiction to recuse themselves from cases
where minors are petitioning the court for a waiver of the state's parental
consent law. Put in the language of the joint opinion from Casey the
question is, do the recusals have "the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus?"1,
75
i. Yes, Recusals Could Create a Substantial Obstacle on the
Minor's Right to Choose
The state interests central to Casey are inapposite to judicial recusal.
Even though Casey dramatically increased the ability of the states to
declare a preference for childbirth over abortion, the state's ability is not
unlimited. 76 The authors of the joint opinion specifically stated "the
means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be
calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it."' 7  Therefore,
the states' ability to place restrictions on a woman's right to choose is
limited to matters that "inform the woman's free choice." Thus, in
addition to regulations designed to protect the health and safety of the
mother, 78 the state is allowed to take steps to ensure the woman's choice
George W. Bush are the most conservative on record in the areas of civil rights and liberties).
Although this study focuses on federal judges it is indicative of a political constituency driving this
broader trend in state judiciaries as well.
72. Ronald Bailey, Some Questions About South Dakota's Anti-Abortion Law, S.F. CHRON., Mar.
12, 20o6, at E3.
73. See Liptak, supra note 5.
74. Id.
75. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,877 (1992).
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Regulations designed to protect the health and safety of the mother are constitutional under
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is "thoughtful and informed."79 This may include ensuring the woman is
informed both of the many alternatives to abortion as well as the many
social and psychological arguments against abortion." In addition, the
state may force the woman to listen to information about fetal
development8' and impose a short waiting period between receiving the
information and obtaining the abortion.2 All of these regulations are
designed to ensure that the woman's choice is given close thought and
attention. The goal is to ensure the woman is aware of the potential long-
term negative mental and physical consequences that may result if she
proceeds with the abortion.
In contrast to regulations and procedures designed to inform the
woman's choice that are supported under Casey,83 the judicial recusals at
issue here do not provide any information, or periods of consideration, to
the minor's choice. Instead, the recusals, if they happen with enough
frequency to rise to the level of state action, impose a significant
impediment to the pregnant minor's right to expeditious processing of
the judicial bypass procedure, and consequently, her right to choose
whether or not to have an abortion. The collective effect of the recusals
does not ensure that a young woman's choice is thoughtful and informed,
since no information about abortion, its effects on the woman, or the
moral and psychological impacts thereof, is conveyed to the minor. In
short, unlike the sanctioned procedures and steps from Casey mentioned
earlier, where the delay imposed on the exercise of a woman's right to
get an abortion is offset by the value gained in the state's interest in
serving a policy goal,84 there is no policy goal being served in the
disruption collective judicial recuasls causes. Therefore, states' increased
ability to regulate abortion laid out in Casey is inapplicable to judicial
recusals.
In terms of their implications for the participants, collective judicial
recusals are more similar to the spousal notification requirement the
Court struck down in Casey than the regulations designed to inform the
woman's choice approved in Casey.' The authors of the joint opinion
stated that the spousal notification requirement would serve as a
substantial obstacle to the many women who are victims of domestic
violence at the hands of their husbands. 6 Whether through actual
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (I973).
79. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
8o. Id. at 882.
8i. Id.
82. Id. at 887.
83. Id. at 882, 887.
84. Id.
85. Cf id. at 897, 898.
86. Id. at 897.
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physical violence or severe emotional intimidation, the Court reasoned
that the spousal notification provision may provide the woman's spouse
with the ability to veto her abortion decision.8 7 Since many of the minors
who exercise the judicial bypass option do so because they fear
retribution or even violence from their parents, 88 collective recusals may
create a situation where the parents may obtain effective veto power
over the minor's abortion decision if the minor cannot receive a
sufficiently expeditious hearing. Thus, collective judicial recusals play a
similar role to that of the spousal notification provision found
unconstitutional in Casey, and any type of veto power over a woman's
right to an abortion has consistently been held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court-first in Danforth and later in Bellotti 11.8 The Court
explicitly established the judicial bypass procedure to prevent a parental
veto over a minor's abortion decision.' Yet if a sufficient number of
judges in one jurisdiction recuse themselves from hearing bypass
petitions such that an expeditious hearing cannot be had, the opportunity
has been created for such vetoes to arise.
Collective judicial recusals serve as a hindrance to the bypass
process, preventing the minor from having an expeditious hearing. In
situations where a critical mass of judges willing to hear bypass petitions
remains, this is an inconsequential hindrance. In situations where the
critical mass is on the side of recusal, it is a hindrance of significant
materiality that can create an implicit parental veto. Some might even
argue that a recusal in itself is a deliberate action by the judge to make
the abortion more difficult to attain. By refusing to hear the case, the
judge has limited the most efficient path of resolution of the issue for the
minor-a fact some judges have acknowledged.9 Here it is important to
note that although the judge's actions may be guided by conscience, their
actions do nothing to serve any legitimate state interest. The result of
each recusal is a small obstacle in the path of the woman's right to
choose, with multiple recusals building into a substantial obstacle. By
imposing a substantial obstacle without any offsetting legitimate state
interest, widespread collective recusals may qualify as an undue burden
on minors' rights to choose if not remedied, and do not qualify for the
exemptions associated with advancing a substantial state interest
outlined in Casey.
87. Id.
88. Henshaw & Kost, supra note 62, at 202 tbl.5 .
89. See Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. 622,647-48 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52,69 (i976).
90. Bellotti H, 443 U.S. at 647.
91. See Liptak, supra note 5.
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B. OBLIGATION OF THE STATE TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE BYPASS
PROCEDURE
As discussed above, Supreme Court precedent in Casey, Bellotti II,
and Danforth requires the inclusion of a judicial bypass procedure in
parental consent statutes for the statutes to be constitutional.92 As a
result, all of the parental consent or notification statutes currently in
place have a judicial bypass option.93 Thus, the presence of the judicial
bypass option in state statutes creates an obligation on state judiciaries to
develop and implement processes to handle bypass petitions. However,
in jurisdictions across the country, there is initial evidence suggesting
occasional breakdowns of the system through failures to adequately
handle bypass petitions because of judicial recusals. 9
The exact number of judges who are choosing to recuse themselves
may be impossible to calculate, as many judges do not speak publicly
about their decision. However, as this problem is becoming more
widespread, and is receiving more and more national attention, it is
possible to get a sense for the depth of the problem. In Memphis,
Tennessee, for example, the majority of the judges in Shelby County
Circuit Court refuse to hear bypass petitions.95 One judge even went on
the record stating "[taking the life of an innocent human being is
contrary to the moral order. I could not in good conscience make a
finding that would allow the minor to proceed with the abortion."
96
Additional research focused on Alabama uncovered that out of the sixty-
seven counties in the state,97 twenty-five were ill-prepared to handle
bypass petitions,98 and another six counties were completely unwilling to
hear the petitions because of the local judges' views about abortion.'
Finally, a similar study of Pennsylvania concluded that the same lack of
preparedness applied to nearly two-thirds of counties in the state. I°°
Given the above, it is not a stretch to conclude that, while the
problem is not universal, the failure of the states to meet their obligation
to provide an effective and expedient judicial bypass procedure is
becoming significant enough across the country to create a constitutional
issue. As discussed in Part II, there is no specific provision of law that
92. See supra Part I.
93. GUTr MACHER INST., supra note 21. In Utah, judicial bypass is available if a minor fails to
obtain parental consent, but there is no bypass option for the state's parental notification requirement.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304.5(4) (Supp. 2006).
94. Liptak, supra note 5.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Silverstein & Speitel, supra note 27, at 85.
98. Id. at 95.
99. Id. at 102.
ioo. Helena Silverstein, Road Closed: Evaluating the Judicial Bypass Provision of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act, 24 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 73, 88 (1999).
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requires individual judges to hear a case when they feel they cannot
neutrally and impartially apply the law. Rather, in such situations, the
law simply requires the judges to recuse themselves. I"' However, despite
the legal propriety of the recusals, a state still has a constitutional
obligation to provide pregnant minors with an effective bypass procedure
if the state has a parental consent law. If the recusals undermine the
effectiveness of the bypass procedure, a state has a responsibility to
either correct the situation or provide for an effective alternative. I2 If
states do not, they are failing their constitutional obligations, and
therefore may not enforce the parental consent and notification statutes.
C. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS AND THE RULE OF NECESSITY
The current solution to the problem of judicial recusals implemented
by many state judiciaries is simply to reassign the petition to another
judge in the same jurisdiction.'" As long as a substantial proportion of
judges are willing to hear such petitions, this likely remains the best
solution. It allows for a seamless transfer of the case with hopefully no
increased burden on the minor. If there are no judges willing to hear
bypass petitions in the jurisdiction where the minor has filed her petition,
an acceptable alternative is to transfer the petition to a neighboring
county. States such as Minnesota and Alabama have enacted such a
solution.' 4 However, neither of these solutions will solve the problem if
all, or a substantial proportion, of the judges in a state, or region of a
state, refuse to hear bypass petitions. In such a scenario, it is the
responsibility of the state to make sure the courts are staffed with enough
judges willing to hear bypass petitions. However, a difficulty arises
because it is virtually impossible for states to ensure that the religious
and moral convictions of the candidates for the state judiciary will not
prevent them from impartially applying the state's abortion law. 5
Therefore, if the current availability of judges to hear bypass
petitions is insufficient to provide for expeditious processing of those
petitions, then it is the responsibility of the state to force the current
judges to hear the petitions under the Rule of Necessity. The Rule of
Necessity is a common law principle dating back to 1430 that requires a
judge to take part in the decision of a case if the case cannot be heard
ios. See supra Part II.
tO2. For a few suggested solutions, see infra Part IV.C.
103. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 440 (199o).
lO4. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 763 (D. Minn. 1986); Silverstein & Speitel, supra
note 27, at 103.
1O5. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[A]ll executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States
and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no




otherwise.' ° According to the Supreme Court in United States v. Will,
"[t]he Rule of Necessity has been consistently applied.., in both state
and federal courts. ' "7 In Will, the Court dealt with a challenge to
Congress's attempts to block statutory cost-of-living wage increases for
federal judges °8 Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that normally,
under 28 U.S.C. § 455, all federal judges ought to recuse themselves from
the case because they all had a personal interest in the outcome-
namely, the amount of their salaries." Consequently, the regular
administrative procedure of reassigning the case to another judge
without a personal interest was not possible."' Thus, the Supreme Court
held that under the Rule of Necessity, the federal judges would be
allowed to hear the case because otherwise there would be no forum for
resolution."' Interestingly, in Will, the Supreme Court raised the issue of
the Rule of Necessity sua sponte, as both the petitioners and respondents
agreed that 28 U.S.C. § 455 did not require the federal judges to recuse
themselves."2 The Supreme Court felt the sensitive nature of the issue
required "the same degree of care and attention" as if either the
petitioners or respondents had raised the issue themselves."3
In the Court's discussion of the use of the Rule of Necessity in both
federal and state courts, it quoted the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
which held:
The true rule unquestionably is that wherever it becomes necessary for
a judge to sit even where he has an interest-where no provision is
made for calling another in, or where no one else can take his place-it
is his duty to hear and decide, however disagreeable it may be.""
In addition, the Supreme Court reviewed the House and Senate
Reports on section 455, which reflected "a constant assumption that
upon disqualification of a particular judge, another would be assigned to
the case."".. Thus, the Court concluded that Congress in no way intended
section 455 to alter the ancient Rule of Necessity." 6 Rather, the Court
reasoned that the purpose of section 455 was to provide litigants with a
fair and neutral forum, and failure to apply the Rule of Necessity in
situations where it is needed would have the contrary effect of
Io6. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213-14 (198o).
107. Id. at 214.
lo8. Id. at 202.
109. Id. at 212.
iio. Id.
111. Id. at 217.
112. Id. at 212.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 214 (quoting Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169, 185 (1870)).
i15 . Id. at 216.
116. Id.
[Vol. 58:869
INFORMAL CLOSING OF THE BYPASS
completely denying the litigants their right to a forum at all. 7
Through comparison to the Supreme Court's analysis of the Rule of
Necessity in Will, it becomes clear that state judges may be forced to hear
bypass petitions, regardless of any moral or religious objections, if that is
the only option available to provide a forum for the minor. Perhaps the
state judiciaries could develop a rotating or lottery system in which
individual judges would only have to hear bypass petitions occasionally,
rather than forcing a few specific judges to hear all of the petitions. If
judges still refuse to hear the petitions under the Rule of Necessity, the
states should consider disciplinary action against the judges."' If enough
judges refuse to hear the petitions so as to make the judicial bypass
mechanism ineffective, and a state is unwilling to enforce the Rule of
Necessity or the disciplinary actions that may be required to make it
effective, then that state cannot constitutionally enforce the parental
consent law."9
Application of the Rule of Necessity is likely the least attractive
solution to the problem of judicial recusals from bypass petitions.
Forcing judges who are opposed to abortion to hear these cases is rife
with potential to produce very negative consequences. For example, in
order to protect the confidentiality of the minor, all bypass petitions are
closed proceedings,'2° and it will be very hard to monitor or police the
actions of rogue judges. If a judge inappropriately interjects his or her
religious or moral beliefs about abortion into the proceeding, there will
be virtually no timely way to correct the situation.
As noted by the Supreme Court in Hodgson, "[t]he court experience
produce[s] fear, tension, anxiety, and shame among minors ....' If a minor
is berated during the hearing by a judge who does not agree with her
abortion decision, the minor may be too humiliated to appeal an
unfavorable decision. With closed proceedings, there is a reduced
likelihood that a judge would be reprimanded for unethical behavior.
Although, the likelihood of belligerent judges is low, it is more likely that
a disinclined judge may listen quietly to a well-qualified case and reject
the petition on moral grounds unrelated to the minor's case. The minor
may appeal, but would have to do so successfully along an incredibly
accelerated timeline in order to reverse the decision in time to affect her
pending choice. More likely such a decision made with prejudice will
117. Id. at 217.
118. See Sambhav N. Sankar, Disciplining the Professional Judge, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1238
(2ooo) (arguing that one of the reasons to impose discipline on judges is to "enforce adherence to the
law itself-so that neutral principles rather than a judge's personal preferences motivate her decision
in each individual case").
II9. See supra Part IV.B.
i2o. Silverstein, supra note 20, at 76.
121. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417,441 (199o).
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stand, as the clock will simply run out for the minor's decision and she
might be forced by the law, and her parents, to carry the pregnancy to
term.
In addition, the Supreme Court's decision in Casey dramatically
increases the negative consequences that may arise from forcing judges
to hear bypass petitions. Casey provided states with the stamp of
approval to express a desire for childbirth over abortion.'22 However,
Casey "is not specific with respect to how far states may go in persuading
women to pursue childbirth rather than abortion."'23 As a result, some
state court judges have gone so far as to appoint the fetus a guardian ad
litem to represent its interests during the hearing.'" Legal scholars who
have analyzed the constitutionality of such appointments have reached
the conclusion that given the state's interest in promoting childbirth over
abortion, the appointment of a guardian ad litem to a fetus is likely valid
under the undue burden standard.' Thus, even though such
appointments are rare, if judges must hear bypass petitions to avoid an
undue burden on the minor's right to choose, the appointments may
become more common.16
D. POSSIBILITY OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
In addition to concerns about creating an undue burden on the
minor's right to choose, judicial recusals also raise the specter of
potential violations of procedural due process. Supreme Court precedent
makes it explicitly clear that "due process requires, at a minimum, that
absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons
forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process
must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard."'27 Although the
right to a hearing is not absolute, and may be waived due to failure to
appear or procedural error,'"8 the Constitution requires that all litigants
at least have the opportunity for a hearing in a "'meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.' ' '29
If all, or a sufficiently large portion, of the judges in an area recuse
themselves from bypass petitions on moral grounds, an additional
argument could be made that pregnant minors' due process rights are
being violated because the minors are denied the opportunity to have
their petitions heard in a sufficiently timely manner. States with parental
122. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,877-78 (1992).
123. Silverstein, supra note 2o, at 93.
124. Id. at 69-7o; see also In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497, 499-500 (Ala. 1998) (discussing the
constitutionality of guardians ad litem for fetuses).
125. Silverstein, supra note 20, at i i i.
126. Id. at 89-9o.
127. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,377 (197).
128. Id. at 378.
i29. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552 (1965)).
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consent or notification laws have imposed strict regulations on minors,
requiring them to involve either their parents or a judge in their abortion
decision. If a minor does not feel as though she can approach her parents
about the topic, her only other choice is to petition the court for a waiver
of the law. Therefore, if all the judges in her area refuse to hear bypass
petitions the minor's opportunity for a hearing in a "meaningful time and
meaningful manner" is denied. Even if there are judges willing to hear
bypass petitions located in other distant parts of the state, the minor may
not be able to have her petition heard by those judges for practical
reasons, such as lack of time and money.3 ' Arguably, this, too, violates
the minor's procedural due process rights. Thus, the possibility for
violations of minors' procedural due process rights creates an alternative
rationale for the argument presented in the preceding parts; however,
such arguments are raised here solely for additional consideration and
are beyond the scope of this Note.
CONCLUSION
As abortion restrictions continue to assert themselves as a political
issue, the prospect of more and more judges recusing themselves from
minors' bypass petitions becomes increasingly likely. While these
recusals are essentially harmless when rare, as they increase in frequency
they greatly enhance their threat to minors' constitutional rights. In
situations where collective judicial recusals have effectively removed a
majority of the judges willing to hear bypass petitions, a substantial
obstacle is created in the path of the minor's right to choose and this is an
undue burden, as defined by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and
consequently unconstitutional.
For parental consent or notification laws to remain constitutional,
the judicial bypass procedure must work effectively. This means states
must ensure there are a substantial proportion of judges willing to hear
the petitions, or, if not, states must enlist the help of judges in
neighboring parts of the state where judges are willing to hear bypass
petitions. If these steps fail, states must force unwilling judges to hear the
petitions under the Rule of Necessity. This escalation is necessary to
ensure that restrictive parental consent laws and concentrated pockets of
socially conservative judges do not combine to undermine minors'
constitutionally-protected reproductive rights. Unfortunately, there is a
risk that in areas of the country where this combination of elements is
likely to be found, the political environment may not be conducive to
executing steps to safeguard minors' constitutionally-protected
reproductive rights. If a state with a parental consent or notification
statute and widespread judicial recusals fails to remedy the situation, and
130. See Silverstein & Speitel, supra note 27, at i I9.
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the problem escalates into an implicit undue burden on minors' rights to
choose, then the parental consent or notification laws would be
unconstitutional, and hence, unenforceable.
